Why GPRU exists
TSN and TCAP need to know that a transfer is authorized without exposing who authorized it. GPRU carries:- scoped permissions (what the transfer is allowed to do)
- commitments (predecessor and successor)
- validity window
- one-time nullifier material
- policy commitment and scope commitment
What GPRU is bound to
The privacy-safe authorization ABI carries:- opaque
authorization_digest - validity window (
valid_after_slot,expires_at_slot) - predecessor and successor commitments (
previous_commitment,new_commitment) sequence,token_idpolicy_commitment,gpru_scope_commitment- one-time
nullifier
Where GPRU sits
Status: Live on Devnet as the authorization layer for TCAP tip credits.
What GPRU deliberately does not link
The sender’s payment intent and the recipient’s GPRU / TCAP transition are not joined by a protocol-level on-chain payment identifier. The privacy-safe path does not pass an intent commitment, recipient TIN, settlement commitment, accepted-intent root, epoch receipt, or TCAP authorization receipt into the TCAP credit instruction. It also does not create a per-transfer nullifier account. Timing, amount, and wallet-level correlations remain outside GPRU’s guarantee.What remains bound for safety
- Governed asset check
- Active policy
- GPRU scope commitment
- Validity window
- Previous commitment and next sequence
- Transition nullifier
Boundary rules
- GPRU cannot spend, exit, mutate a tip, or drain a liquidity pool.
- A GPRU signature is not a spend proof.
- A hash-only or placeholder payload is not a spend proof.
Related
TSN
Settlement coordination and epoch treasury.
TIN
Payment identity and route discovery.
TCAP
Private balance accounting.
Architecture
End-to-end sequence diagram.